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Abstract 
Recent studies on health financing reform in Ghana have focused on the institutional legacies and political 
forces underpinning the dramatic shift from “cash-and-carry” to policy initiatives that find expression in 
universalism and social inclusion. Yet little attention has been paid to the complex interactions between 
institutional and ideational elements that account for the policy failure of Ghana’s National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS). Drawing primarily on government records, published books, articles and newspaper 
publications, we argue that formulating appropriate financial reform strategies requires a proper understanding 
of how national identities intersect with, and shape the politics, design, and operation of social programs to 
inform policy outcomes. The article suggests that the sustainability of Ghana’s NHIS rests on strategic reform 
measures including, cost containment, diversified funding and operational arrangement, as well as 
depoliticization of the health regime. 
Keywords:Health insurance, health politics, social protection, social citizenship, cost recovery, health financing   
DOI: 10.7176/PPAR/11-1-05 
Publication date: January 31st 2021 
 
Introduction   
Good health is one of the most important dimensions of human life, and a very essential determinant of a person’s 
capabilities (Sen 1999, 2002). Indeed, beyond its intrinsic value, health is instrumental in shaping the educational 
fortunes, employability, cognitive development, income earning abilities, and social status enhancing elements 
relating to participation in governance, dignity, safety, security and empowerment of the citizenry. Importantly, 
health care is a critical component of social citizenship and a political symbol that rests on distribution, provision, 
and access (Béland, Foli, & Kpessa-Whyte, 2018; Johnson Redden, 2002). The recognition of citizens’ entitlement 
to health care, however, has proven to be an issue that evokes remarkable tension, particularly against the backdrop 
of fiscal constraint and the need for national integration. This makes necessary an examination of how national 
identities intersect with, and shape the politics, design, and operation of social programs to inform policy outcomes. 
Despite the growing wave of health care reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, there is limited attention to the central 
role of ideas in policy development and implementation (Béland & Ridde, 2016). In the context of the present 
article, it is imperative to understand that health care (as citizenship) is embedded with ideational elements that 
can provide analytic purchase on the complex nature of health policy making and reform. Drawing theoretical 
insights from the ideational literature and citizenship discourse, we use Ghana’s experience of health care reform 
to illustrate the complexities surrounding the policy failure of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). We 
argue that although the Scheme is broadly understood as a symbol of national identity and has a comparative 
advantage over the previous cash-and-carry system, it is necessary to examine how health reform strategies and 
development are shaped by the concept of “nested” factors that challenge the normative premises and sustainability 
of social programs such as the NHIS. With the advantage of more than a decade since it was introduced and the 
benefit of hindsight, this study builds on earlier works by Agyepong and Adjei (2008), Seddoh, Adjei, and Nazzar 
(2011), Giovanni Carbone (2011), Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh and Heinmiller (2015), and Osei-Akoto & 
Adamba (2017) on the institutional legacies and political factors that shaped the path-departing and far-reaching 
shift from cash-and-carry to financing of health care services through health insurance scheme in Ghana. 
The role of ideas in the policy process is well established. As most scholars suggest, ideas play a central role 
in shaping political behaviour and outcomes, and provide a richer understanding of the political and social world 
(Beland & Cox, 2011; Fischer, 2003; Schmidt, 2008). While the relationship between ideas and policy 
implementation is recognized by policy scholars, it has been only recently that the ideas-implementation nexus 
has been examined in a systematic and detailed manner (Béland & Ridde, 2016; Ridde, 2009; Schofield, 2001). 
 
1 Michael Kpessa-Whyte, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. His research 
interests include social policy, governance, institutional analysis, and democracy and comparative public policy. His previous articles were 
published in Canadian Journal of African Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Canadian Public Policy, and the International Review of Political 
Economy among others. 
2 Ebenezer Bossman Agyei, Ph.D. is an Adjunct Faculty with the Department of Political Science, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. His 
research interests include social policy, comparative healthcare politics, governance, development studies, gender and human rights 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online)  
Vol.11, No.1, 2021 
 
50 
Perhaps the conception of policy implementation as a simple and straightforward process helps to explain the 
predominant focus on ideas as relevant to questions about agenda setting. As Mehta (2011) notes, it is important 
to understand exactly how ideas matter. In a similar vein, Campbell (2002) draws our attention to the discursive 
marriage between ideas and policy outcomes. The recent work by Béland and Ridde (2016) on health care reform 
in Africa, for instance, clearly illustrates the potential role of ideas in policy implementation, focusing more 
generally on the ideas of street-level actors central to the implementation process.  In the context of the present 
study, we examine more broadly how national identities construct citizenship and vice versa, and the complex 
interplay (and impacts) of context, discourse, and institutional elements central to the design and operation of 
Ghana’s NHIS.  
The rest of the paper is organized into six sections. The first section discusses arrangements for financing 
health care in Ghana prior to the introduction of the NHIS. While in the second section, the paper focuses on the 
foreground politics that facilitated the introduction of the NHIS; the third section discusses the institutional design 
of the Scheme.  The governance arrangements and the overall operations of the Scheme is the focus of the fourth 
section of the paper.  Section five of the paper analyzed some of the major institutional challenges associated with 
the health insurance scheme. In concluding, the sixth section shares some ideas on possible options for reforming 
the scheme to enhance its ability to effectively meets its established objectives.   
 
Health Financing Approaches Prior to NHIS  
Ghana’s attainment of independence in 1957 brought with it among others, ‘’free’’ health care in public health 
facilities for the entire citizenry. This consideration meant that there was no direct out-of-pocket payment at the 
point of consumption of health services in public health facilities. Ghana’s immediate post-independence era was 
thus defined by the idea of social citizenship, and characterized by a system of health financing that guaranteed 
relatively universal access (Seddoh & Akor, 2012; Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto, 2012). However, this golden 
age of social welfare was short-lived as sustainability of this form of financing came under serious scrutiny when 
the economy began to show signs of decline in the face of competing demands on the same source. Gradually, 
there was a substantial reduction in health spending. It was, however, not after the overthrow of Ghana’s first 
President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, that the policy of health financing based on social citizenship began to change. 
In 1969, when the Progress Party assumed office under the leadership of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, the government 
introduced hospital user fees to support financing of health care and to minimize abuse of the health system (1969 
Hospital Fees Decree). This legislation was later amended to become the Hospital Fees Act of 1971(Act 387) 
(Carbone, 2011; Nyonator & Kutzin, 1999).   
Ghana was not immune from the global economic upheaval of the 1970s and 1980s, and as the domestic 
economy began to succumb to the crises (Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Konadu Agyemang, 2001), the military 
administration of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was compelled to escalate the financing 
arrangement as part of the conditionalities of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), that sought to recover  
15 percent of recurrent health costs (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008; Carbone, 2011; Nyonator & Kutzin, 1999). 
This cost recovery measure became popularly known in Ghanaian parlance as ‘cash-and-carry’, which denotes 
“cash before care” (Kusi-Ampofo et al., 2015, p. 195).  Under this system, citizens had to pay for hospital service 
at the point of service delivery. From an ideational standpoint, the cash-and-carry approach to financing health 
care was seen as a viable policy response to enhance health delivery and curtail citizenry abuse of the public health 
system (Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto, Anum, & Adukonu, 1999; Béland & Ridde, 2016). However, in a society 
where large majority of citizens live below the poverty line, the cash-and-carry approach had disastrous effect on 
the populace (Konadu-Agyemang & Takyi, 2001). As a pay-per-service policy, by its design, the market approach 
to health care financing restricted access to healthcare to a few rich individuals who were privileged to afford. As 
others have argued, most citizens who could not afford the cost of health care turned to self-medication and other 
cost-saving measures, including increased preference for untested traditional herbal medications (Oppong, 2001; 
Wahab, 2008). Asenso-Okyere et al. (1999), for instance, observed that healthcare professionals such as nurses, 
doctors, and other staff in hospitals and health centres in Ghana took advantage of the government’s inability to 
monitor the implementation of the user-fee policy to indulge in imposition of illegal and exorbitant fees for 
personal gains. 
In fact, the deleterious effect of the austerity measures not only entrenched moral hazards (abuse and 
corruption) and resort to self-medication, but also broadly contributed to a myriad of challenges including the 
following: dilapidated health infrastructure; understaffed facilities; low pay and low morale; increased health 
complications and national death toll; and brain drain (Asenso-Okyere, Anum, Osei-Akoto, & Adukono, 1998; 
Oppong, 2001; Konadu-Agyemang & Takyi, 2001).  Overall, the health sector was characterized by a downward 
trajectory, fraught with despair and a sense of a looming socio-political crisis. Indeed, these issues speak to the 
citizenship narrative and contemporary discourse on the role of the state in nation building (Béland et al., 2018; 
Johnson Redden, 2002). Importantly, one of the ways by which the citizenry resisted the imposition of the cash-
and-carry policy was the establishment of community-based health financing schemes based on resource pooling 
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and solidarity. As resistance to the cash-and-carry grew, the military government of the PNDC drew inspiration 
from these community initiatives and began to actively encourage communities and religious organizations “to 
introduce insurance schemes jointly managed by the facility and the community as a strategy to avoid the problems 
associated with paying for service at the point of care” (Sulzbach, Garshong, & Owusu- Banahene, 2005, p. 3).  
 
Politics of the National Health Insurance Scheme 
The costs and hardships imposed on the citizenry by the cash-and-carry approach of the 1980s and the 1990s forced 
policy makers to initiate a process in search of alternatives for health financing.  Realizing the impact of the full 
cost recovery in the health sector, particularly in an environment of abject poverty, the government initiated a 
process to replace the policy. In 1985, the first proposal for national health insurance, rooted in an economic 
liberalization framework, was made after a commission established by the government completed its prefeasibility 
work (Asenso-Okyere, 1995). This first mover idea was limited in scope as it was intended to provide non-
contributory mandatory coverage for civil servants, other formal sector employees, registered cocoa farmers, and 
an optional premium-based coverage for Ghanaians in the informal sector. Under this arrangement, government 
was to pay for civil servants, employers for employees and the Ghana Cocoa Board for cocoa famers, and it was 
suggested the funds for the scheme be privately managed by a Health Insurance Company whose responsibilities, 
among others, included dispensing ambulatory and hospital services to those covered by the scheme through public 
and private healthcare providers (Asenso-Okyere, 1995; Osei-Akoto & Adamba, 2017). Although the idea was 
seen as a better alternative to the cash-and-carry policy, its implementation could not take off, arguably because 
the officials of the Ghana Health Service saw the idea of establishing a new company to manage funds meant for 
financing healthcare as an attempt to outsource their responsibilities to another organization over which they may 
have no control (Osei-Akoto & Adamba, 2017).   
The return to constitutional rule in 1992 opened a window of opportunity for various policy actors to clamour 
for change in the country’s existing health financing policy. For the political parties, the “crisis” in financing 
healthcare provided an opportunity to echo the concerns of the citizenry by criticizing the government and 
proffering what they thought would be the best alternative. For instance, prior to the 1996 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), chastised the ruling National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) for what it considered the government’s lukewarm attitude towards the crisis facing 
the health sector and continuous existence of cash-and-carry. Their critique was based on the foregrounding 
premise that the policy of “cost recovery at the point of service has proven notoriously callous and inhumane” and 
promised that the system of financing healthcare services will be thoroughly overhauled and the cash-and-carry 
system reviewed, with a view for evolving a more equitable system including health insurance and other repayment 
schemes” (NPP Manifesto 1996, 37). The NDC on the other hand, argued that the NPP was being opportunistic in 
deliberately ignoring initial steps taken by the government towards the introduction of health insurance for all 
Ghanaians.  Against the background of the importance attached to health financing in the elections, following the 
NDC’s victory in the 1996 elections, President Jerry John Rawlings indicated in his State of the Nation address to 
parliament in 1997 that “this year, a pilot Insurance Scheme will be implemented in Eastern region to test the work 
done so far. Its performance will be studied, as well as the existing rural health Insurance Schemes so that problems 
can be identified and eliminated before the implementation can be done on National scale” (Rawlings, 1997).  
With the active participation and leadership role of the Ghana Health Service, the government launched pilot 
health insurance schemes in four districts consisting of  New Juaben, Sunhun/kraboa,/Coaltar, South Birim, and 
South Kwahu in the Eastern Region (Mensah, 2011), following the model of the mutual health insurance scheme 
initiated by the Catholic Church in Nkoranza in the Brong Ahafo Region ( Mensah, 2011; Sabi, 2005; Heyen-
Perschorn, 2005). The NDC administration was of the view that the pilot schemes, when allowed to mature, will 
provide useful lessons for a nationwide rollout of a health insurance scheme, hence must be allowed enough time 
in operation for the appropriate lessons to be drawn to inform how a nationwide health insurance program could 
be designed. However, the reality of exclusion and inequity inherent in the cash-and-carry system did not allow 
for adequate time and reflection on lessons that could be garnered from the pilot schemes. Consequently, in the 
build-up to the 2000 general elections, health financing became a politically charged policy issue again with all 
the political parties offering to replace the cash-and-carry policy with an insurance scheme. For instance, during 
his campaigns toward the 2000 general elections, Dr. Edward Mahama, the Presidential candidate of the People’s 
National Convention Party (PNC) promised to repeal the cash-and-carry policy and replace it with an American-
style health insurance program under which the poor and vulnerable will be dependent on government financing 
(Seddoh, Adjei & Nazzar, 2011).   
Similarly, Dr. Abubakar Al-Hassan, Chairman of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), also expressed his 
party’s abhorrence of the cash-and-carry system and pledged the commitment of the CPP to replace it with a health 
insurance plan for the citizenry. The presidential Candidates for both the National Reform Party (NRP) and the 
United Ghana Movement (UGM) were also explicit in promising a shift in health financing to an insurance-based 
approach. As the opposition parties stepped up their criticisms, the government moved further to expand the scope 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online)  
Vol.11, No.1, 2021 
 
52 
of the ongoing health insurance pilots in 2000 to three Districts including Bole, Nkoranza and Dodowa in the 
Northern, Brong Ahafo and Greater Accra Regions respectively (Seddoh, Adjei & Nazzar, 2011). The effort by the 
NDC administration notwithstanding, the party was defeated in the 2000 general elections by the NPP.   
Perhaps the NDC was punished at the polls by the electorate because their promised health reform was not as 
forceful enough, and failed to effectively address the harsh realities of the health environment. Indeed, this 
development captures how citizens’ expectations about health care and state-society relationship has evolved over 
the years. As Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, and Heinmiller (2015) note, the NPP, having campaigned with a 
message of health reform, “was mindful of its promise, fully aware of the dire consequences if it failed to abolish 
cash-and-carry before the 2004 general election” (p. 207). To be sure, by 2001 when the NPP administration 
assumed office, several factors had coalesced to firmly place the replacement of the cash-and-carry system with a 
health insurance program on the policy agenda (Seddoh et al. 2011).  Specifically, several policy actors including 
think tanks, civil society organizations, the media, academics, and transnational actors had built up momentum in 
anticipation of a nationwide implementation of the health insurance scheme based on the existing experience. 
Moreover, even though the health financing policy based on the NPP’s own ideology required some elements of 
individual responsibility and choice, the period of the early 2000s was witnessing a shift in the global policy 
discourse away from strict market fundamentalist dogma to a focus on the social dimensions of development policy 
that prioritises social protection and poverty reduction (Kpessa-Whyte, 2018). More generally, the political debate 
and discourse over health financing points to the potential impact of citizenship and ideational factors on policy 
and development outcomes.    
It is striking to note that despite popular support for the idea of health insurance, once the issue arrived on the 
policy agenda, differences in preference of the type of insurance to be introduced became apparent. For instance, 
the NPP administration opted to introduce a centrally controlled and managed health insurance fund. However, 
following from its experience with the piloted district-based health insurance scheme, the NDC argued for the 
adoption of a decentralized health insurance arrangement that allows every district to own and manage its insurance 
program (Kusi-Ampofo et al., 2015). This position was supported by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), whose sponsored research on the matter concluded that “while they [the district mutual 
health organizations] are not a panacea for resolving health care financing and delivery issues, many of their 
limitations—small size, limited benefits, and inability to cover all segments of the population, especially the 
poorest—can be overcome with appropriate design and management” (quoted in Singleton 2006: 25).  Other policy 
entrepreneurs, especially the private insurance companies argued and lobbied for the establishment of legislative 
arrangement for the operation of purely competitive private health insurance system (Kusi-Ampofo et al., 2015). 
As evident in the next section, the final structural design of what constitutes health-financing arrangement reflects 
this divergent design preferences and an attempt to accommodate multiple ideological differences. It goes without 
saying that the ideological tension or balance between individual responsibility and collective welfare lie at the 
heart of the citizenship discourse (Johnson Redden, 2002).   
 
Institutional Design of the Health Insurance Scheme  
The NHIS Act, 2003 (Act 650) that established the health insurance scheme provided for the operations of a three-
tier health financing arrangement consisting of (i) a national health insurance scheme, (ii) community mutual 
health insurance scheme and (iii) private commercial health insurance scheme. Agyepong & Adjei (2008) argued 
that the healthcare financing arrangement established by the policy is  “hybrid that comprised a classical single 
payer scheme for the organized formal sector, and multiple payer semi-autonomous Mutual Health Organizations 
(MHO) for the non-formal sector. Private commercial health insurance would also be allowed for those who felt 
they could afford it and preferred it” (p. 155). In its initial design, the first tier, which is known as the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), was structured to operate semi-autonomous District Mutual Health Insurance 
Schemes (DMHIS) that allow residents in each of the districts in Ghana to join the NHIS through membership 
registration in a DMHIS. In 2012, the enabling National Health Insurance Act, 2003 (Act 650) was repealed and 
replaced with the National Health Insurance Act, 2012 to absorb all the DMHIS into one centralized NHIS 
(National Health Insurance Act, 2012 (Act 852).    
According to the NHIS policy, with the exception of the members of the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana 
Police Service, it is mandatory for all persons resident in Ghana to enrol in either the NHIS, community mutual 
health insurance or undertake a private commercial health insurance plan. While employees in the formal sector 
have involuntary enrolment by virtue of their contributions through the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) regarding the funding of this tier, informal sector workers and other citizens are required to pay 
specified annual premium based on income to enrol for coverage into the first tier. The policy granted exemption 
from payment of premium to a significant number of the citizens, especially elderly persons above 70 years of age, 
persons below 18 years whose parents are members of the scheme, and others classified as indigent. For the 
purposes of this policy, the term indigent refers to persons who (a) are unemployed and have no visible means of 
earning, (b) does not have an easily identifiable place of residence, (c) does not live with a person employed who 
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has an identifiable place of residence, and (d) does not have any regular source of support from any person (Witter 
& Garshong, 2009; Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto, 2012; National Health Insurance Regulations, 2004).  
The NHIS derives its funds from eight main sources namely, (a) the National Health Insurance Levy provided 
for under section 47; (b) two and one half percentage points of each person’s contribution to the Basic National 
Social Security Scheme; (c) moneys that are approved for the Fund by Parliament; (d) moneys that accrue to the 
Fund from investments made by the Authority; (e) grants, donations, gifts and any other voluntary contributions 
made to the Fund; (f) fees charged by the Authority in the performance of its functions; (g) contributions made by 
members of the Scheme; and (h) moneys accruing under section 198 of the Insurance Act, 2006 (Act 724) (National 
Health Insurance Act, 2012 (Act 852) . While the NHIL accounts for about 70% of the total funds accruing to the 
scheme, payroll deductions from formal sector workers constitute about 23%. Funds obtained from payment of 
premium by all residents in Ghana not on formal sector payroll is about 5% and other funds including returns on 
investment constitute about two percent. The types of health condition covered by the NHIS is provided for in 
Legislative instrument 1809, and this comprise maternity services including caesarean deliveries, emergency 
services, oral health treatment, out-patient services, most in-patient services, specialist care, most surgeries, general 
ward accommodation, diagnostic testing and minor operations such as hernia repairs, breast and cervical cancer, 
and pre-approved list of prescription drugs (National Health Insurance regulations, 2004). The NHIS is said to 
provide coverage for about 95% of all ailments that afflict Ghanaians (Witter & Garshong, 2009; Blanchet, Fink, 
& Osei-Akoto, 2012). This scheme, however, does not provide coverage for expensive surgeries, cosmetic 
surgeries, cancer treatment, kidney dialysis, organ transplant, assisted reproduction, mortuary services, non-listed 
drugs, HIV retroviral drugs, echocardiogram, photography and physiotherapy, among others (Blanchet, Fink, & 
Osei-Akoto 2012; Witter & Garshong, 2009; National Health Insurance Regulations, 2004).  
The second layer of the national health insurance system in Ghana is the community mutual health insurance 
schemes, which are essentially resource-pooling arrangements for people living in a common locality with the 
purpose of financing the cost of healthcare for their members. These types of strategic adaptation schemes 
originated as forms of local citizen’s resistance that emerged against the cash-and carry regime when communities 
began to make contributions into common pool to collectively mitigate the risks associated with the 
commodification of health services. In a sense, they were illustrations of how the power of the people 
disempowered the force of public policy by pointing to alternative financing arrangements that ultimately 
influenced the shift to national health insurance in Ghana. To operate as a community mutual health insurance 
scheme, the entity must register with, and be licensed by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA).    
Community-based health insurance schemes, otherwise known as Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme 
(PMHIS), exist exclusively for the benefit of their members. Any identifiable group of persons in Ghana who 
satisfy the requirement of the NHIA, can form and operate this type of health insurance scheme. Members were 
drawn from people living in a common locality or people sharing similar occupations like farmers, fisher folks, 
traders, or individuals who share a common religious faith, among others.  Companies and business entities are, 
however, not permitted to enrol their employees in this type of mutual schemes.  In other words, the community-
based health insurance schemes were opened to only natural persons as their members and not to corporate 
institutions. As a membership-based insurance scheme, this layer of the health financing arrangement did not 
receive any subsidy from the health insurance fund, and so depends solely on the contributions of its membership.  
Any group of persons that wish to establish community-based mutual health insurance scheme is required to 
provide proof of at least one million Ghana cedis (GHS 1,000,000.00) of paid-up subscription as initial minimum 
capital. Prior to the commencement of operations, community-based mutual health insurance schemes are expected 
to submit a business plan that provides details of the operations, as well as insolvency risks mitigation of the 
scheme for at least three years to the NHIA (NHIA, 2015a).   
Premiums of community-based health insurance schemes are determined by its Board of Directors, who are 
also responsible for ensuring uniformity in the quality of health services received by members of the scheme. 
Although independent managers appointed by their Board of Directors manage these types of Schemes, the 
operations and activities of the scheme are expected to be in compliance with the overarching directives of the 
NHIA. As part of the rules of the game, every registered community based health insurance scheme is required to 
set aside 20% of its minimum capital as reserve fund, which is only available to the scheme on specified conditions 
in the event of “substantial loss arising from liability to members or providers and the loss cannot reasonably be 
met from its available resources” or  “only in the event of the closure or winding up of the health insurance business 
for the discharge of the liabilities arising out of policies transacted by the insurer and remaining undischarged at 
the time of the closure or winding up of the insurance business” (NHIA, 2015-Guidelines).  Atim, Grey, Apoya, 
Anie, & Aikins (2001) note that successful community-based insurance schemes usually encourage their members 
to actively participate in the management and decision-making processes as a way of promoting, building social 
capital, and social learning, the lack of which accounts for the failures of some health insurance schemes. 
Following recent reforms, this second layer has, however, been collapsed into the centrally managed first tier.    
The third layer in the structural design of Ghana’s health financing arrangements, which is now the second 
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tier by default is also based on an insurance model and referred to as Private Commercial Health Insurance Scheme 
(PCHIS).  These types of health financing schemes operate as business ventures based on market principles. Given 
that private health insurance entities existed long before the coming into force of the legislations that sought to 
regularize the health insurance environment in Ghana, this layer is an attempt to accommodate pre-existing private 
insurance companies financing healthcare, and further liberalize the policy environment to encourage private 
sector participation. In other words, this type of health insurance is profit-driven and operates on the basis of a 
rational calculus. As opposed to cross subsidization, this type of health insurance privileges a mechanism based 
on the calculated risks of particular subscribers. In this regard, subscribers to a private commercial health insurance 
scheme, which include groups or companies and individuals, are made to pay higher or lower premium based on 
their classification on the high-low risk continuum. Being schemes run purely as business establishments, they are 
not entitled to any subsidy from the national health insurance fund (National Health Insurance Act, 2012; NHIA, 
2015a). Like the second layer, the management of these types of schemes are also entrusted in the hands of 
independent managers appointed by their respective Board of Directors. Unlike the second layer, however, the 
private commercial health insurance schemes are driven primarily by profit for their shareholders.    
To qualify as a PCHIS, a company must register with, and be licensed by the NHIA. However, to be licensed, 
a scheme must show proof of at least five million, five hundred thousand Ghana cedis (GHS 5,500,000) 
constituting paid-up capital, of which five hundred and fifty thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS 550,000.00) representing 
10% is to be deposited in the Scheme account with the Bank of Ghana as security deposit. This amount is subject 
to review by the NHIA, and is expected to remain with the Bank of Ghana for as long as the company exists as a 
health insurance scheme. Private health insurance schemes can make withdrawals from the security deposit subject 
to an application to and approval by the NHIA. However, approvals for any such withdrawal can only be based on 
proven knowledge that the scheme had suffered “a substantial loss arising from liability to members or providers 
and the loss cannot reasonably be met from its available resources” and  “the withdrawn amount shall be replaced 
by the scheme not later than ninety (90) days after the date of withdrawal” (NHIA, 2015a, p. 9). In the event of 
closure of the business, the security deposit is also made available to the company within the confines of directives 
by the NHIA.  It is instructive to note that beyond the reserve fund and the security deposit, both the community 
mutual health insurance schemes and the private commercial health insurance schemes were mandated to maintain 
a contingency fund equivalent of 5% of net profit or surplus for use in times of crisis (NHIA, 2015). The private 
health insurance providers only pay for services obtained by their subscribers or members from hospitals and other 
health institutions that have been duly accredited by the NHIA.   
 
Governance Framework and Operation of the Scheme   
The governance of the health financing system is vested in a NHIA, which in addition to the managerial and 
administrative responsibility for the national single paper scheme, also doubles as the regulator of the commercial 
and mutual health insurance scheme. As a regulator, the NHIA is the sole authority that registers, licenses and 
supervises any health insurance entity in Ghana. Overall, the NHIA is charged with the full implementation of the 
NHIS, and healthcare providers that seek to offer NHIS services are obliged by law to obtain accreditation from 
the Authority to safeguard the quality and integrity of their operations. The NHIA is also responsible for prudent 
management of funds accruing from general revenues and others sources into the National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF). Monies from the NHIF are used to offset the healthcare costs of subscribers and for the broader 
administration of the Scheme.  
Given its broad spectrum, diversity, and complex nature of the governance and administrative framework, the 
NHIA operates as a decentralized system with offices at the regional and district levels. Services provided by these 
offices include membership registration, accreditation of service providers, renewal of membership ID cards, 
management of health claims and provider payments, amongst other activities. As part of measures to boost public 
confidence, as well as ensure equitable and efficient health service delivery, the NHIA has introduced a diverse 
range of innovations including a centralized claims processing centre, electronic claims management, clinical 
audits, capitation, biometric ID health cards, and increased use of information communication technology (NHIA 
Annual Report, 2013). Under the new NHIS law, three committees namely, (a) Finance and investment Committee 
(b)  
National Health Insurance Oversight Committee; and (c) Private Health Insurance Oversight Committee have 
also been established to improve the NHIA’s efficiency and overall delivery. 
Prior to the 2012 amendment of the original NHIA legislation, the district level scheme of the NHIS operated 
as semi-autonomous entities with their own Boards of Trustees, Scheme Managers, and committees established by 
the District Assembly for health insurance related matters (Mensah, Oppong, and Schmidt, 2009). In terms of 
administrative and managerial hierarchy, the NHIA is steered by a Board at the apex. There is a Chief Executive 
Officer who has responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the entire health financing system, and is 
answerable to the Board in performance of duties assigned to that position. Below the Chief Executive Officer 
exists a wide range of staff of various professional and technical background that assist in the effective 
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administration of the schemes. These supporting officials include three Deputy Chief Executives, technical 
directors and deputy directors of multiple directorates and departments. Following from the central tenets 
embodied by the health insurance arrangement, the NHIA operates with the overall objective of providing 
protection against financial risk and the cost of quality basic health care for all residents in Ghana (NHIA Annual 
Report, 2013).  
In terms of its operation, the scheme has since its establishment made modest progress in expanding financial 
access to healthcare for many Ghanaians. The law establishing the health insurance schemes in Ghana made it 
mandatory for all Ghanaians to subscribe to any of the three tiers, and “a 10-year grace period was stipulated in 
the law (Act 650) before strict enforcement would start” (Fenny 2017, p. 355). The private and commercial health 
insurance scheme together had combined subscriber membership of about 144,000 as at the end of 2016.  As shown 
in the figure below, at the end of the same year, the total membership of the NHIS was 11,029,339, representing 
about 39% of the total population of the country.  Notwithstanding the overall relative progress made in providing 
financial access to healthcare, about 60% of Ghanaians are not covered by any of the three tiers under the NHIA 
even after more than a decade since the scheme was established.   As figure 1 shows, enrolment into the scheme 
grew at a fast rate within the first five years of its inception and has since hovered around 39% of the population.  
Figure 1: Trends in NHIS Membership from 2005 
 
Source: NHIA 2017-the graph is generated from data submitted by the NHIA to the National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC) towards the preparation of the 2016 Annual Progress Report.   
Subscribers or members of the NHIS are placed in three different categories, and these include persons in the 
informal sector of the economy who are required to pay an annual premium, formal sector workers who are 
compelled through compulsory monthly salary deductions of 2.5%, and the exempted category which includes 
persons under eighteen years of age, persons 70 years and above, pregnant women, and others who for various 
reasons are described as indigents, all of whom are enrolled into the scheme without any direct cost to the 
individual. Table 1 below provides a breakdown of the regional distribution of various categories of subscribers to 
the scheme.  Overall, majority of the members or subscribers of the NHIS are in the exempted category and, 
therefore, access healthcare on account of the NHIS without any premiums. While Ashanti Region has the highest 
number of the exempted members, Upper West Region has the lowest proportion of exempted NHIS members.  
Table 1: Regional breakdown of various categories of NHIS members  
REGION   INFORMAL    EXEMPT   SSNIT  
CONTRIBUTORS  
TOTAL  
 ASHANTI   610,085  1,444,760  76,731  2,131,576  
 BRONG AHAFO   381,627  896,716  40,171  1,318,514  
 CENTRAL   247,845  604,039  36,149  888,033  
 EASTERN   425,030  867,474  60,074  1,352,578  
 GREATER ACCRA   581,060  892,991  121,898  1,595,949  
 NORTHERN   226,995  863,426  17,403  1,107,824  
 UPPER EAST   152,587  486,224  14,483  653,294  
 UPPER WEST   130,833  356,959  10,507  498,299  
 VOLTA   235,110  535,990  32,521  803,621  
 WESTERN   325,985  628,702  36,646  991,333  
 Total   3,317,157  7,577,281    446,583   11,341,021  
Note: Informal includes 0.2% of security services, Exempt excludes SSNIT contributors: Source: National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC) 2017  
Since coming into force, the NHIA has accredited a number of health service institutions with the view to 
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making healthcare accessible to all Ghanaians. Accredited health facilities refer to both public and private sector 
health service providers at which members or subscribers of the national insurance scheme are permitted to obtain 
specified services at a cost to the scheme. The increasing number of service providers accredited across the country 
and the geographical spread is an indication of the growing popularity of the scheme across the country. For 
instance between 2009 and 2013, the NHIA granted accreditation to a total of 3,822 health service providers. The 
regional distribution of the number of health service providers accredited in each of the ten regions are illustrated 
in figure 2 below:   
Source: NHIS 2013  
As shown in figure 2 above, at the end of 2013, while Ashanti, Eastern, Greater Accra and Western Regions 
had the highest number of NHIS accredited service providers, Upper East and Upper West regions had the lowest 
number of NHIS accredited facilities. The remaining regions, which include Brong Ahafo, Central, Northern, and  
Volta regions had between 321 and 376 NHIS accredited service providers. The  NHIS accredited facilities include 
various institutions that provide services in relation  to healthcare such as “Chemical Shops, CHP Zones, Clinics, 
Dental Clinics,  Diagnostic Centres, Eye Clinics, Health Centres, Laboratories, Maternal Homes, Pharmacies, 
Physiotherapy, Polyclinics, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Hospitals and Ultrasound” (NHIA, 2013, p. 8). About 
54.3% of the accredited service providers are health facilities wholly owned and operated by the government, 
while the remaining are either established by religious organizations, private establishments or partially owned by 
the state.  Undoubtedly, the coming into force of the NHIS seems to have revolutionized access to healthcare in 
Ghana. In particular, as indicated in Figure 3 below, outpatient utilization of health services on account of the 
NHIS rose from 597,859 visits in 2005 to 26,875,489 in 2016. Similar trends are observed in inpatient utilization, 
which increased from 28,906 to 1,416,065 within the same period.   
Figure 3: Trends in outpatient and inpatient utilization of NHIS  
 
Source: NHIA 2017  
Although the annual increase in the number of visits made by NHIS subscribers to the accredited health 
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background of poor health seeking behavior imposed by the previous cash-and-carry system, the phenomenon has 
been narrowly interpreted as “positive because people now visit the hospitals often for their healthcare needs. It 
reflects improved health seeking behavior and outcomes of Ghanaians” (Republic of Ghana, 2016, p. 29). Research 
has shown that women enrolled in the NHIS tend to have fewer birth complications and infant deaths (Mensah, 
Oppong, Bobi-Barimah, Frempong, & Sabi, 2010). These positive observations arguably stem from the enhanced 
accessibility to health care, reduction in self-medication, a shift from the delay in hospital visits to earlier diagnosis, 
and provision of free maternal and child health services under the scheme (all of which embody the substance of 
citizenship).   
Nonetheless, the rising number of visits to health facilities calls for improvement in preventive public health 
education, which when successfully carried out could lead to a decline in the number of visits to health facilities 
and save the scheme significant amounts of money to meet demand, while protecting the principles behind resource 
pooling. Figure 4 below shows the financial claims on the NHIS by health service providers between 2005 and 
2014.  The NHIA paid a total of 1,073 million Ghana cedis in 2014 compared with 7.6 million Ghana cedis in 
2005. The difference of over 14,018 Ghana cedis in payments made by the NHIA to service providers within the 
same period raises obvious and troubling concerns about the financial sustainability of the scheme if such trends 
persist.   
 
Source: Republic of Ghana, 2016  
As figure 4 illustrates, payments by the NHIA for services provided to NHIS subscribers has been on the rise 
since the scheme replaced the previous cash-and-carry program. While this trend is the result of the growing 
numbers of people subscribing to the scheme as the primary preference for financing healthcare in Ghana, the 
rising cost of healthcare is also a major contributory factor for the annual growth in claims made on the scheme 
by service providers. The rising financial claims on the scheme are also partly attributed to fraudulent claims by 
some health service providers in connivance with subscribers to the scheme. For instance, a senior management 
official of the scheme noted that fraudulent claims by service providers, double and over-payments were due to 
over-invoicing, irregular behaviour of some members of the scheme who hopped from one pharmacy to the other 
with the same drug prescription to access the same services already obtained elsewhere, among others, as some of 
the challenges contributing to the growing financial burden on the scheme (Citifmonline, 2015). Clearly, the social 
constructions and realities observed in the health arena not only point to the complexities of health policy 
implementation, but also generates important questions concerning reform efforts.  
 
Challenges of the National Health Insurance Scheme  
The primary objective of the NHIS has been to eliminate health affordability obstacles by providing financial 
access to healthcare. Undoubtedly, the NHIS as a first tier has been successful in expanding health coverage to 
about 40% of the population within a short period of time. It is not only better than the cash-and-carry health 
financing arrangement it sought to replace; it also holds the key to providing access to quality healthcare, and has 
better prospects for equity in health service delivery. However, careful analysis of the scheme reveals a number of 
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challenges and design flaws with backward linkage to the operation of the scheme. In terms of the design, the 
NHIS has a series of inherent challenges that have significant implications for its efficient management as well as 
sustainability.  
First, the element of ‘exemption’ grafted into the NHIS as an avenue for providing relief and access to those 
who cannot afford to be members through premium-based subscription, has opened the floodgates for rapid 
enrolment into the scheme. In a country with high levels of poverty and inequality, this is not surprising. And while 
the growth in membership of the NHIS is often seen as an achievement, a large majority of over 60% of this 
membership is within the exempted category (NHIA, 2015b). This implies that majority of NHIS members make 
no direct financial contributions to the scheme although they enjoy the same rights and privileges as the monthly 
and annual premium paying members. By this design, the financial burden associated with the management of the 
scheme is shifted to the few workers in the formal sector who make monthly contributions through 2.5% payroll 
tax deductions, and those in the informal sector who voluntarily subscribe via annual premiums. Of particular 
interest is that while these exemptions protect the collective entitlement of the vulnerable and less-privileged in 
the society, at the same time, it draws our attention to how national identities and solidarity affect public policy, as 
well as raise questions concerning the normative premises of social citizenship and cohesion (Johnson Redden, 
2002). The challenge, then, is how to accommodate the financial burden imposed by the exemtptions without 
sacrificing quality and undermining the values of social citizenship.  
A second but related problem is that the design of aspects of the exemption for those classified as indigent 
does not only provide too much discretion to management in making decisions about who qualifies under this 
category, but it also opens the entire scheme to abuse and political manipulation. The exemption policy is 
problematic, especially because Ghana does not have a reliable and comprehensive data system from which to 
pick citizens who face abject poverty, nor has the country a robust mechanism for identifying the most vulnerable 
among the population for targeting. As Aryeetey et al. (2013) and Macha et al. (2012) observed, the framing of 
these criteria makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to identify persons who qualify to merit this exemption. 
Furthermore, in a country where poverty and inequality remains pervasive despite recent experiences of economic 
growth, compounded by the challenge where a significant proportion of the population consider themselves 
unemployed, granting free access to healthcare services under the NHIS implies that several people including even 
those who can afford to pay annual premiums could hide under the unemployed or poverty criteria to qualify for 
the indigent exemption. Thus, the way and manner in which these exemptions are designed has the potential to 
promote free riding and irresponsibility among subscribers. Similarly, the open-ended nature of the indigent clause 
suggests that politicians seeking to win the support of specific segments of the population could manipulate it to 
their advantage.   
Third, although granting the elderly cohort of the population exemption under the NHIS is instrumental in 
ensuring elimination of obstacles that could impede their access to health services, again the intuitive design of 
that very exemption raises a number of concerns surrounding normative ideas about the state-citizenship 
relationship. For instance, it is only the elderly population that is 70 years and above that qualifies for this 
exemption. The challenge with this criterion is not only inconsistent with the age of retirement in Ghana (i.e., 60 
years); it automatically excludes a significant proportion of the elderly cohort aged 60-69 who constitute the 
majority of the elderly in the country. Given that majority of Ghanaians are without any formal income support at 
old age, this segment of the population are likely to be inadvertently excluded from the health insurance scheme 
due to poor economic circumstances (see for instance, Fenny, 2017; Fenny, Kusi, Asante, & Arhinful 2016). Fenny 
(2017) noted that  “the most financially vulnerable among those aged 60 to 69 are the least likely to have health 
insurance coverage” (p. 367). In addition, for a country whose life expectancy is around 67 years, it is disingenuous 
to peg the age for exemption of the elderly under the NHIS at age 70 due to the possibility that most of the elderly 
population might not get the services when they most need it nor live long enough to enjoy the free access to 
healthcare that begins only at 70 years. More importantly, the exemption granted the elderly population does not 
cover major health challenges such as dementia, trachoma, blindness, cancers, arthritis, stroke, hypertension, heart 
diseases, diabetes, malignant neoplasm, trachoma and alzheimers that are generally associated with ageing.     
Another design challenge of Ghana’s health financing arrangement is the parallel operation of the three tiers 
for the same health services. As discussed earlier, what emerged as the three-tier, and later reduced to two-tier 
health financing system was an attempt to strike a compromise and accommodate various interests, preferences, 
and ideas floating around as options for financing healthcare in Ghana. However, designing various financing 
layers to compete for the same subscribers and for the same services has resulted in a number of challenges. The 
existing arrangement creates room for duplication and fraud, especially because individuals can subscribe to the 
NHIS under any of the other two tiers at the same time, and make claims on each one of them for the same services 
obtained. Although the NHIA tries to clarify this problem by arguing that an individual who subscribes to more 
than one of the financing schemes reserves the right to choose which one of them to be charged for the services 
used, in practice, the NHIA has no comprehensive means of tracking duplication arising from subscription to 
multiple schemes, nor has it any effective strategy of monitoring and evaluating claims submitted by individuals 
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to either the private mutual health insurance or private commercial health insurance scheme for which payment 
has already been made by the NHIS.  In addition, because all the three schemes were designed to operate 
concurrently by competing for subscriptions from the Ghanaian people, the NHIS has by its geographical spread, 
economies of scale, and other resource capabilities effectively crowded-out the other private providers,  leaving 
them with less than one percent of the market share of subscribed membership (Gajate-Garrido & Owusua, 2013).   
The combined effect of these design flaws is that while the NHIS is celebrated for making modest gains in 
expanding access to healthcare as well as improving  utilization of health services, the reality is that the scheme is 
financially insolvent and has often been unable to honour its obligation to service providers, let alone doing so on 
time. The inability of the scheme to promptly make payments to service providers has resulted in threats of 
rejection and outright rejection of the NHIS membership cards by some of the accredited service providers. Service 
providers have also been reported to compel NHIS card bearing members to instantly make upfront payment in 
order to receive healthcare services. For instance, in August 2015, the Health Insurance Service Provider 
Association of Ghana (HISPAG) took a decision not to treat any patient seeking health services on account of the 
NHIS card arguing that the NHIS had failed to honour its indebtedness of over 125 million Ghana cedis to its 
member facilities (Myjoyonline, August 4, 2015). Earlier in July 2014, the Christian Health Association of Ghana 
(CHAG) took a similar decision on the basis that the inability of the NHIS to pay the facilities had affected their 
ability to purchase medical supplies to effectively and efficiently take care of patients (Daily Graphic, July 2, 
2014). To avoid this kind of situation, some of the well-endowed private hospitals and health facilities in the 
country have elected not to accept the NHIS subscription for their services and operate purely on the basis of either 
cash-and-carry or private insurance membership schemes. Perhaps a more troubling concern is the fact that arrears 
owed service providers continue to accumulate, thus exacerbating the challenges pertaining to the payment of 
health claims by the NHIA. More recently,  HISPAG lamented the perennial delay in claims payment, which had 
resulted in about 20 months of arrears due its members (Citifmonline, February 13, 2018). Consequently, the 
scheme is faced with a challenge of how to remain relevant to its objective of ensuring protection of the 
underserved, especially the poor and vulnerable against financial barriers impeding access to healthcare, while at 
the same time addressing threats posed to the sustainability of the scheme by inadequate funding and rising cost.   
 
Options for Reform  in Lieu of Conclusion  
The challenges of the health financing arrangement presents an opportunity for reforms that address the systemic 
and operational challenges. Lessons drawn from the operations of the health insurance schemes in Ghana highlight 
the need to (a) contain cost and (b) increase revenue of the NHIS. The spiralling financial burden of the NHIS is 
partially a result of its design weaknesses. Although one of the objective of the NHIS is to serve as social insurance 
scheme that focuses on addressing challenges imposed by poverty on access to healthcare, the category of persons 
exempted from paying premiums under the NHIS needs to be reviewed for practical considerations, and to ensure 
the scheme does not become a burden onto itself. For instance, while the premium paying members consisting of 
adults in the informal sector increased only by 0.7 percentage points, the number of persons in the exempt category 
including “new exempt group of women seeking maternal healthcare” increased by 7.7 percentage points between 
2010 and 2015 from 54.9% to 62.6% respectively (Osei-Akoto & Adamba, 2017, pp. 396-397).   
Several options exist for reviewing the exemption policy under the NHIS. For instance, rather than granting 
exemption to both children and adolescents who constitute about 40% of the exempt persons, a reviewed 
exemption policy could consider limiting this exemption to only children between the ages of 0-12 years and allow 
younger adults aged 13 to 18 years to be processed on to the scheme on the basis of socio-economic circumstances 
and means-testing. In addition, given that the elderly population that are unfortunate to suffer major ageing related 
illness are few and in between, the exemption granted the elderly could also be reviewed and limited to only 
specific and contextually informed health challenges associated with ageing in order to encourage burden sharing, 
which is one of the policy goals of the Scheme. Even with the elderly population, it is still possible to design their 
exemption on the foundation of means-testing to ensure that only those who really need to be supported are granted 
access to healthcare on account of the NHIS. Taken together, these options for addressing the challenges posed by 
the exemptions granted under the NHIS will significantly reduce the free rider problem and serve as a cost cutting 
measure to save the scheme some funds without compromising the social insurance objectives of the scheme. And 
of course, this does not suggest policy lock-in; the rules governing the exemption policy should be amenable 
enough to be able to quickly adapt to changing circumstances or realities of the health and fiscal environment.  
Another approach to cost containment for the NHIS will be to reduce the number of health services it is 
designed to accommodate, and dismantle concurrent operation by competition between the NHIS and the other 
providers. In other words, rather than having the NHIS and embedded tiers compete among themselves, the design 
of the health financing arrangement could be reconfigured so that the NHIS is made truly mandatory for everybody, 
takes care of limited basic healthcare needs, while companies and communities operating the other two schemes 
compete for subscribership for health services outside the NHIS approved list of benefits enjoyable by its members. 
This arrangement would allow the NHIA to make a strong case for employers and business establishments as 
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distinct entities to also make some additional monthly contributions to the national health insurance fund, 
especially because their employees, and in fact customers, are mandatory beneficiaries of the NHIS. Thus, by 
reducing the list of health services paid for by the NHIS, the policy will free up space for private health insurance 
in the areas uncovered by the national scheme, allow individuals some autonomy in making decisions about which 
types of additional health insurance to purchase as a supplement to the NHIS depending on their healthcare needs, 
and ultimately eliminate the phenomenon of duplication and fraud presently associated with the existing design of 
the health financing system.   
Another option for improving the financial sustainability of the scheme will be to craft the cost sharing 
arrangements for specific health services in a manner that will engender individual responsibility and minimize 
abuse (moral hazards) of the scheme. Co-payment is a cost sharing mechanism that will allow for transfer of a 
small fraction of costs associated with specific health services obtained by NHIS subscribers to the insured to pay 
directly to service providers. The economic purpose of the NHIS reduces financial risk of illness for the insured. 
But the rates of utilization so far anecdotally suggests that some of the insured increase their health care utilization 
even if not necessary due to the elimination of direct financial barriers. Cost sharing arrangements exist in various 
forms including deductible, co-insurance or co-payment, and ceiling, all of which may require the insured or some 
of them to pay a fraction of total cost of services obtained from service providers. When designed properly, a 
contextually based cost sharing mechanism could contain the moral hazards associated with utilization of health 
care, while enabling the NHIS to control the cost of health insurance without compromising the social purpose of 
the scheme.   
The NHIS needs to be futuristic in its outlook and operations. For instance, the NHIS can diversify the nature 
of its operations beyond addressing only the financial costs associated with the curative aspect of health care. 
Investing in well-planned and empirically informed preventive public education campaigns targeted at behavioural 
change could help to minimize the incidence of ill health among the population and, by extension, save the scheme 
some much-needed funds. The poor sanitary conditions surrounding most food services across the country, for 
instance, is a crucial area worthy of attention, especially as food-related ailments hold the potential to exact 
considerable financial burden on the NHIS. It also makes sense for the NHIA to take advantage of modern 
technology and other avenues of public education to reach out to inform and share available scientific knowledge 
about life style patterns that have overall positive linkage to good health, as well as the everyday little and taken-
for- granted living habits that have implications for individual health. One way to undertake this public health 
campaign, especially in the rural areas, is to take advantage of the country’s existing national service (youth 
service) program, to deploy trained and well-motivated national service personnel to every community on a regular 
basis to meet with the people to share new information, best living and life style practices that promote and 
minimize the incidence of diseases. Aside public education and sensitization, it is also imperative for the 
government to strengthen and enforce lax regulatory standards pertaining particularly to the operations of the 
proliferative food industry.  When adopted, the above measure could limit the costs faced by the scheme without 
comprimsing its original intent.   
Finally, it is equally important to move beyond politicization of the NHIS by governments, as well as open 
up new avenues for the flow of revenue to the scheme without necessarily increasing existing premiums and the 
national health insurance levy. Against this backdrop, it is imperative to rethink the continued deposit of insurance 
payments into the Consolidated Fund, and to devise mechanisms that allow for the direct transfer of the National 
Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) to the NHIL account. Such an approach could help to address the current practice 
of using NHIA funds for other purposes, and in some respects, allow for a more effective mechanism of resource 
distribution and payment of health claims. That being said, given the effects of use of both tobacco and alcohol on 
human health, it is worth introducing a new and higher tax regime on the purchase of these items to support the 
financial operations of the scheme. Such taxation could prove instrumental in shaping consumer behaviour 
regarding these items and, in turn, minimize any adverse effects associated with consumption of these items on 
the healthcare system. All in all, Ghana’s NHIS as a social policy experiment is fraught with tension and dilemmas 
to which there is no easy solution, and formulating appropriate financial reform strategies requires a proper 
understanding of how national identities interact with ideational, political and institutional forces to inform policy 
development.       
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